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[1] As consumptive extractions and water scarcity pressures brought about by climate
change increase in many world river basins, so do the risks to water-dependent ecological
assets. In response, public or not for proﬁt environmental water holders (EWHs) have been
established in many areas and bestowed with endowments of water and mandates to manage
water for ecological outcomes. Water scarcity has also increasingly spawned water trade
arrangements in many river basins, and in many instances, EWHs are now operating in
water markets. A number of EWHs, especially in Australia, begin with an endowment of
permanent water entitlements purchased from irrigators. Such water entitlements typically
have relatively constant interannual supply proﬁles that often do not match ecological water
demand involving ﬂood pulses and periods of drying. This article develops a hydrologic-
economic simulation model of the Murrumbidgee catchment within the Murray-Darling
Basin to assess the scope of possibilities to improve environmental outcomes through EWH
trading on an annual water lease market. We ﬁnd that there are some modest opportunities
for EWHs to improve environmental outcomes through water trade. The best opportunities
occur in periods of drought and for ecological outcomes that beneﬁt from moderately large
ﬂoods. We also assess the extent to which EWH trading in annual water leases may create
pecuniary externalities via bidding up or down the water lease prices faced by irrigators.
Environmental water trading is found to have relatively small impacts on water market
price outcomes. Overall our results suggest that the beneﬁts of developing EWH trading
may well justify the costs.
Citation: Connor, J. D., B. Franklin, A. Loch, M. Kirby, and S. A. Wheeler (2013), Trading water to improve environmental flow
outcomes, Water Resour. Res., 49, 4265–4276, doi:10.1002/wrcr.20323.
1. Introduction
[2] Economists have long advocated water trading as a
means to allow dynamic and efﬁcient reallocation of water
to higher-value uses as diverse water use values evolve and
change [Easter et al., 1999; Howe et al., 1986]. Recent dec-
ades have seen the increasing emergence of water markets in
a number of middle-income developing countries (e.g., Chile
and Mexico), as well as for higher-income developed coun-
tries (e.g., the western U.S. and Australia) [Grafton et al.,
2011; Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick, 1997]. Water trade com-
monly involves annual leases of irrigation water amongst
irrigators [Michelsen and Young, 1993; Quiggin, 2006]. For
example, in-season water transfers via simple market and
redistribution arrangements have helped New Zealand
irrigators to avoid supply shortfall during drought [Hay-
ward, 2006], while Australian irrigators now commonly
use formal and informal water leasing (referred to as
water allocation trading in the local vernacular) to manage
risk positions within and across seasons [Bjornlund,
2004; Connor and Kaczan, 2013]. Similarly, irrigators in
the western US [Hansen et al., 2008] and Chile [Bauer,
2004] tend to favor water leasing over permanent transfers
as the former is possible under simple institutional
arrangements. Annual water leases from irrigators to gov-
ernments or water utilities are also common, especially
during times of drought to meet municipal industrial water
supply deﬁcits. Such transactions occur, for example, in
the U.S. of California [Howitt, 1994] and Georgia [Cum-
mings et al., 2004] and in parts of Spain [Pulido-Velaz-
quez et al., 2008].
[3] Government and nonproﬁt entities also operate in
many river basins to achieve environmental objectives
[Garrick et al., 2011; Hadjigeorgalis, 2010]. In the western
US, environmental water recovery projects date back to the
late 1980s, with signiﬁcant volumes of water leasing for
environmental ﬂow purposes being documented. For exam-
ple, Scarborough and Lund [2007] identify 7400 GL of
environmental transfers between 1998 and 2005, while
Garrick et al. [2012] catalog 24 programs totaling 3000 GL
of environmental transfers ; mainly through lease or spot-
market transactions.
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[4] A challenge arises for environmental water managers
who acquire permanent water entitlements from irrigators
because the temporal proﬁle of releases from entitlements
developed for irrigation are unlikely to provide a ﬂow
regime consistent with realizing environment goals. Irriga-
tion water entitlements are typically developed through use
of dams and release rules to smooth ﬂow variation across
seasons and provide relatively constant supply to irrigators
across irrigation seasons [Dreverman, 2013]. In contrast,
ecologically desirable ﬂow regimes generally mimic natu-
ral ﬂow patterns, with episodic large ﬂoods followed by
periods of drying [Overton et al., 2009].
[5] If an environmental water holder (EWH) can partici-
pate in an annual water lease market, they should be able to
lease in water to increase environmental water supply when
greater ﬂow is ecologically desirable and lease out water
when drying is helpful in realizing riverine and riparian
ecological health objectives [Kirby et al., 2006]. This is a
possibility in the Australian Murray-Darling Basin (MDB),
where since 2004 the Commonwealth, states, and various
organizations have acquired a signiﬁcant volume of perma-
nent water entitlements through purchases from willing
sellers and investments in efﬁciency improvements to real-
locate water from irrigation uses [Wheeler and Cheesman,
2013; Lane-Miller et al., 2013]. The water bought by the
Commonwealth since 2007–2008 will be managed by an
entity known as the Commonwealth Environmental Water
Holder (CEWH). Enabling legislation allows the CEWH to
lease part of its permanent water right when environmental
demand is less (for example, a year after a large ﬂood) and
save the proceeds to lease water from irrigators in years
when this is environmentally beneﬁcial [Commonwealth
Environmental Water Holder (CEWH ), 2011].
[6] In considering the implementation of an EWH trade
scheme, some deductions are obvious and do not require
empirical assessment. For example, economic logic and
water market experience suggests that allowing those man-
aging permanent water entitlements for the environment
the ﬂexibility to participate in an annual water lease market
should facilitate some possibilities to improve environmen-
tal outcomes. This logic holds as long as reallocation
between seasons can be helpful ecologically, and transac-
tions costs in annual water lease markets are small
[Wheeler et al., 2013]. It can also be concluded a priori that
irrigators will only trade on water lease markets if this
improves their welfare. Still, there can be signiﬁcant con-
cerns that are not easily understood without empirical mod-
eling of the magnitudes of environmental ﬂow responses
and water market effects.
[7] One signiﬁcant concern, voiced by some in the MDB
is that the magnitude of potential environmental beneﬁt
may be too small to justify the costs of developing trading
strategies and transacting in annual water lease markets
[CEWH, 2011]. Others are more optimistic and suggest that
allowing annual EWH leasing could achieve desired environ-
mental objectives with a smaller endowment of permanent
water entitlements [Peterson et al., 2005; Tisdell, 2010;
Wheeler et al., 2013]. However, such leasing activity may
mean that irrigators who are not direct parties to EWH trade
may be impacted through pecuniary externalities. A relatively
large EWH market participant, who will hold at least 20% of
all permanent water entitlements in the MDB, could bid up
the market price. Irrigators wishing to lease in more water
could face increased costs when the EWH also stands to ben-
eﬁt from leasing in water. Likewise, irrigators wishing to
lease their water out in the same years as the EWH could ex-
perience lower prices than they would otherwise. To the
extent that water markets are unconstrained, no loss of efﬁ-
ciency would be expected through pecuniary externalities;
still they may be of concern to some as they will tend to redis-
tribute any surplus amongst water buyers and sellers.
[8] To understand the magnitude of potential environ-
mental beneﬁts for EWH trading in an annual water lease
market and the scale of potential pecuniary externalities for
irrigators, we develop an integrated hydrologic, economic,
and environmental model where the EWH has acquired
irrigator water entitlements. These water entitlements have
a temporal proﬁle of release that is distributed relatively
evenly over years, consistent with irrigators’ preferences,
but not well matched to environmental demand. In one sce-
nario, the EWH can only supply environmental water in the
temporal proﬁle associated with the water entitlements it
has acquired from irrigators. In a second scenario, the
EWH participates on an annual water lease market to better
meet environmental watering objectives.
2. Murrumbidgee Catchment
[9] Our case study in the MDB is the Murrumbidgee
catchment in southern New South Wales (Figure 1). The
headwaters for the river are located in the slopes of the
Great Dividing Range, and the river runs westward until it
joins with the Lachlan River and then the Murray River
near Balranald. Reliable stocks of water are provided by
the Eucumbene and Tantangara Dam in the Snowy Moun-
tains and the Burrinjuck and Blowering Dams near Can-
berra. Covering 900 km, the Murrumbidgee has an annual
average ﬂow of approximately 4400 GL and provides water
supply for the towns of Wagga Wagga, Gundagai, Hay, and
Grifﬁth. It also provides irrigation water to the Murrum-
bidgee Irrigation Area (MIA) and Coleambally Irrigation
Area, as well as some smaller irrigation schemes. The area
supplied represents approximately one quarter of the total
MDB-irrigated area. Common crops in the MIA include
rice, wheat, grapes, citrus, and vegetables. The majority of
MIA’s crops are annual and of lower commodity value,
which is one of the reasons it has been a net exporter of
water allocations to Victoria and South Australia through
water trade from 1998 to 2010 [Kirby et al., 2012; National
Water Commission (NWC), 2011].
[10] Water extractions in the MDB grew over time such
that withdrawals are now estimated to average 53% of
available water for the MDB as a whole [CSIRO, 2008].
This extraction level and the most severe drought on record
(the 1998/1999 to 2009/2010 Millennium drought) led to
signiﬁcant environmental issues for the Murrumbidgee
River system. These issues included poor ﬂoodplain Red-
gum and Blackbox forest conditions, and pressure on
water-bird and native ﬁsh stocks dependent on healthy wet-
land and ﬂoodplain habitats. Although the region’s ﬂood-
plain forests can survive droughts to some extent through
mechanisms such as reliance on stored water and reduced
transpiration, beyond a certain ‘‘return interval’’ threshold
between inundations, trees will begin to die off. Rates of
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die off will increase in concert with the return interval
length. Review of recent evidence [Overton and Doody,
2013] suggests that ﬂoodplain forests die off rates increase
at an increasing rate when the interval between return ﬂows
exceeds approximately three times the predevelopment
inundation interval.
[11] During the Millennium drought, when environmental
ﬂows creating inundations at sufﬁcient intervals were absent,
environmental assets such as the mid-Murrumbidgee Wet-
lands, the Lowbidgee Floodplain, and the Fivebough and
Tuckerbil Swamp Ramsar listed sites suffered signiﬁcant
degradation [CSIRO, 2008].
3. Methodology
[12] To simulate the above context, an integrated model
was developed for the Murrumbidgee River catchment area
with submodels representing the hydrologic system, the ec-
ological response to water ﬂows, and the economic aspects
of managing environmental water ﬂows including the dy-
namics of annual water lease prices. The water balance
base case mimics conditions that prevailed prior to any
environmental water reallocation with release and storage
decisions designed primarily to meet irrigation water
demand. Environmental water reallocation scenarios
involve reallocation of a fraction of permanent irrigation
water entitlements with and without EWH annual lease
market trade. Environmental damages are represented func-
tionally as an exponential loss increasing in time following
ﬂoods of deﬁned magnitudes. This captures the fact that
ecosystems suffer damage at an increasing rate the longer
they experience drought beyond the duration to which they
are adapted.
[13] Simply reallocating water without EWH trade can
beneﬁt some parts of the ﬂoodplain by providing moderate
ﬂoods at increased intervals. However, other parts of the
ﬂoodplain that require larger ﬂoods continue to suffer lon-
ger intervals between inundation than what they are
adapted to and hence experience exponential damage. By
participating in the annual water lease market, the EWH
has the opportunity to lease water to irrigators in years
when there has been a recent inundation, and therefore, lit-
tle damage results from reducing seasonal environmental
ﬂow. This activity allows fundraising to ﬁnance leasing
from irrigators in future years in order to create larger
ﬂoods when the return interval between ﬂoods is longer.
The motivation is that this can avoid exponentially rising
environmental damage.
[14] The strategy of selling soon after ﬂoods and buying
when longer, more damaging intervals of drought can be
avoided is challenging because, while conditions in a given
year can be observed, future year ﬂows must be anticipated
on the basis of imperfect expectations. We represent this
limited foresight with an objective function for the EWH
that involves minimizing the sum of current period known
environmental outcomes of alternate leasing decisions, as
well as the expected values of future ﬂow and environmen-
tal outcomes. Annual lease water price dynamics are
important because they determine costs and returns to
EWH leasing decisions and also because they are a poten-
tial source of pecuniary externalities inﬂicted on irrigators.
We determine current period and expected future water
lease prices using a regression simulation approach: the
Figure 1. Murrumbidgee River Catchment (source: Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA)
[2012a]).
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past water price is regressed on past seasonal allocations
and the resultant relationship is used to simulate prices
resulting from further additions or subtractions to annual
lease market supply by a trading EWH.
3.1. Hydrology Submodel
[15] The hydrologic water balance model includes water
inﬂows, dam stocks and ﬂows, diversions, and losses. It is an
extract from aMDB-wide water balance model, described in
more detail in Kirby et al. [2012]. In the extract, we repre-
sent the Murrumbidgee catchment alone with ﬁve spatial
elements: a headwaters region, the Snowy Mountains,
which produces annually varying inﬂows into all dams in
the catchment; the dams, represented as a single dam with a
3600 GL capacity; a single river reach downstream of the
dam; an irrigation diversion point on the downstream reach,
representing all irrigation in the catchment; and an environ-
mental asset at the end of the downstream reach, comprising
the Lower Murrumbidgee Swamps. For modeling simplic-
ity, water inﬂows to the single dam (It,r) are treated as exoge-
nous and predetermined for the historic climate sequence.
The predetermined inﬂows are calculated from the biophysi-
cal relationships between rainfall, pan evaporation, runoff,
and evaporative losses and basin inﬂows, and calibrated
against river ﬂow records from Kirby et al. [2012].
[16] The sum of total annual releases for irrigation (iwt)
and all purposes other than irrigation (cwt) that were a fea-
ture of water allocation policy prior to environmental ﬂow
reallocation represent our modeling base case. These base
case releases are simulated assuming current level of irriga-
tion development and current allocation rules governing
releases with historical climate time series inﬂows for the
113 year period from 1896 to 2008. In the base case, all his-
toric permanent irrigation water entitlements with annually
varying release patterns over years (iwt) are assumed to be
available for irrigators, with none available for the EWH.
[17] To model the EWH with permanent water entitle-
ments acquired from irrigators, we assume that 20% of all
historic irrigation permanent water entitlements have been
reallocated to the EWH who therefore has access to the
associated annual releases, ewt. Prior to any EWH annual
leasing activity, the EWH water holdings have the same
interannual variability as historic annual irrigation releases,
iwt. The assumed 20% reallocation level was chosen
because it is generally consistent with lower-bound target
recovery ﬁgures of 2400 GL expressed in Murray-Darling
Basin Authority (MDBA) plans.
[18] The water balance equations for the dam are
S0t ¼ St1;r¼river þ It;r¼headwater  iwt  ewt  ett  cwt  lt;r¼dam:
ð1Þ
spt ¼ max 0; S 0 t  SMax
h i
: ð2Þ
St;r¼river ¼ S 0 t  spt: ð3Þ
where
[19] t is an index of years; r is an index of geographic
element equal to ‘‘headwaters’’ for the element upstream
of the dam, ‘‘dam’’, and ‘‘river’’ for the river element
downstream of the dam. This index is used for components
of ﬂow that occur in more than one type of geographic ele-
ment; S0t is a temporary dam water accounting variable
equal to the value of initial dam storage plus all inﬂows
minus all outﬂows and losses, but before spills are
accounted for; spt is dam spill which is zero if the sum of
initial storage (St-1,r¼dam) plus net inﬂow is less than the
maximum dam storage capacity (SMax) and is equal to
inﬂow plus initial storage in excess of maximum storage
otherwise; St,r is the dam or river reach storage level at
time t and is equal to initial storage (St-1) plus net inﬂows
up to the capacity of the dam or river reach to hold stored
water (SMax) ; It,r is the inﬂows to geographic element r,
which for the dam is an exogenous time series calculated
by the hydrology model; lt,r is losses at time t from the
inﬂows to element r, calculated as a ﬁxed proportion of
inﬂows that varies by element ; iwt is irrigation water
released from the dam at time t that, in the base case (i.e.,
with no environmental water), is given as an exogenous
time series calculated by the hydrology model or, in the
cases with environmental water, is given as the exogenous
input less (ewt) plus or minus any environmental water
traded (ett) ; ewt is the environmental water release from
the dam prior to any environmental water trade; and cwt is
conveyance water release representing all other water
releases.
[20] The outﬂows from the dam are the sum of the nega-
tive quantities on the right hand side of equation (1) and
spills. In principle, they can exceed the sum of initial dam
storage plus inﬂows (St-1,r¼damþ It,r¼headwater) which
implies that the dam storage (St,r¼dam) would become nega-
tive. To prevent this, in any time step in which equation (1)
would result in a negative storage, the outﬂows are adjusted
downward such that St¼ 0 (and any adjustments are
handled in the downstream river reach, as described later).
Thus outﬂow from the dam are described by equation (4).
Ot;r¼dam ¼ min½ðiwt þ ewt þ ett þ cwt þ lt;r¼damÞ þ spt;
ðSt1;r¼dam þ It;r¼headwaterÞ: ð4Þ
[21] The outﬂows from the dam, with the additional of
runoff within the river reach (rot,r) form the inﬂows into
the river reach.
It;r¼river ¼ Ot;r¼dam þ rot;r: ð5Þ
[22] The irrigation supply is diverted from the river
reach, and the reach also incurs losses (from evaporation
and seepage), so the outﬂow from the river equals the
inﬂows less losses, irrigation diversions, and any change in
river channel storage as seen below:




[23] The river reach has a storage capacity (in the river
channel itself, in irrigation canals, in on-farm and off-farm
storages, in backwaters, etc.). For simplicity, we consider
this to be a single element treated similarly to dam storage
in equations (1)–(3). This storage capacity has the inciden-
tal consequence of providing an adjustment mechanism to
resolve the possibility of outﬂows in excess of inﬂows plus
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storage in equation (4): irrigation and environmental ﬂow
demands are still satisﬁed (from storage) despite the short-
fall in outﬂows from the large headwater dam through
changes in river reach storage.
[24] The outﬂows at the end of the river reach Ot;r¼river
 
represent the ﬂow into the Lower Murrumbidgee Swamps.
This is inﬂuenced by environmental releases (ewt) but also
by EWH water trading. The traded water (ett) can be posi-
tive or negative according to whether environmental water
is purchased or sold. It is subtracted from water released
from the dam for the environment and added to water avail-
able for irrigation (if environmental water is leased to irri-
gators ett is negative) or added to environmental water
release and subtracted from irrigation supply (if environ-
mental water is leased from irrigators ett is positive).
3.2. Ecological Response Model
[25] The environmental value function used in this analysis
relates to the idea of a threshold interval between inundations
as discussed earlier. The Murray-Darling Basin Authority
(MDBA) in its determination of the ecological responses to
ﬂow in the Murrumbidgee distinguishes between six inunda-
tion zones; each different in predominant ecological compo-
sition because of the frequency of inundation that would have
occurred prior to signiﬁcant extractions. For each zone, the
MDBA developed estimates of the frequency of inundation
that would be required to achieve ecological targets for the
zone with a high probability. These frequencies with the area
impacted and ecological habitat by inundation zone are
shown in Figure 2 and Table 1 [Murray-Darling Basin
Authority (MDBA), 2012a].
[26] The salient point is that ﬂora, ﬁsh, and bird habitat
and populations can be expected to remain healthy if the
inundation frequency is less than or equal to the frequency
recommended for each zone (EFi) in Table 1. When the pe-
riod since inundation frequency grows beyond the recom-
mended inundation return frequency threshold levels,
ecological damage increases at an increasing rate. This is
represented with an environmental damage function that
grows exponentially with an increasing number of years
above the threshold level in equation (7) (Figure 3).
[27] Damage is summed over zones with a weight for
each zone (wj) proportional to the area in the zone (see last








[28] The index j denotes the inundation zones in Table 1,
where eij,t is a binary variable, with a value of 1 indicating
that ﬂow greater than or equal to the ﬂow level EFj required
to inundate zone j is provided in year t ; and ehj,t is a count
of years since ﬂow exceeded EFj.
[29] The variables (eij,t, ehj,t) are updated iteratively on
an annual time step with equations (8) and (9):
eij;t ¼ 0; . . . if . . .Ot;r¼river  EFj: ð8Þ
ehj;t ¼ eij;t ehj;t1 þ eii;t
 
: ð9Þ
[30] Equation (8) compares ﬂow to inundation threshold
level for each zone (EFj) if ﬂow exceeds the threshold for a
zone, the binary indicator eij;t
 
set to zero and is otherwise
set to 1, indicating insufﬁcient ﬂow to inundate the zone
occurred that year. Equation (9) counts years since an inun-
dation for each zone and resets the count to zero when an
inundation occurs.
3.3. Environmental Water Holder Submodel
[31] The EWH has an objective of delivering water in a
pattern that minimizes damages from increasing return
time since inundation beyond the threshold frequencies in
Table 1 associated with a high probability of maintaining
good ecological health. The ability to achieve the environ-
mental objective is limited by water available to the EWH.
However, the EWH can inﬂuence inundation frequencies
(EFj) by trading on the annual lease market. The control
variable (ett) is the level of water leased to or from irriga-
tors, which can take positive or negative values.
Figure 2. Ecological habitat and inundation zone
frequencies (source: MDBA [2012a]).
Table 1. Murrumbidgee Environmental Flow Objectives






of This Size (EFi)
Average
Frequency-Proportion of








170 GL 1.33 72.5 68 11,718
270 GL 1.4 65 57 6,340
400 GL 1.67 57.5 52 8,164
800 GL 2 45 39 24,401
1,700 GL 4 22.5 18 57,334
2,700 GL 6.67 12.5 9 78,046
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[32] The EWH begins with an exogenously determined
annually varying river outﬂow (Ot,r¼river) available to the
environment as inﬂow, as explained in equation (6). The
EWH then has the ability to lease ett GL of water to or
from irrigators with a maximum lease to irrigators equal
to the EWH’s available water for that year (ewt.). How-
ever, the possibility to lease water from irrigators is also
constrained by a budget limit, as described later. The
EWH’s objective is to minimize the exponent of the area
weighted sum of differences between actual environmen-
tal ﬂow return intervals (ehi) and the target return inter-
vals, EFi (equations (11) and (12)). This objective is also
mapped over the time horizon to tþ n years, where t is the
starting year and n is the length in years of the planning
interval. The problem takes the form of a dynamic optimi-
zation model employing a running horizon algorithm.
Running or rolling horizon algorithms have long been
used in the operations research literature to model
dynamic problems in which agents have imperfect fore-
casts of future events. Baker and Peterson [1979, p. 341]
deﬁne the algorithm as when ‘‘[a] rolling schedule is
formed by solving a multiperiod problem and implement-
ing only the ﬁrst period’s decisions; one period later the
multiperiod model is updated and the process repeated.’’
See Chen et al. [2011] for a recent application in the agri-
cultural economics literature.
[33] Because the model involves discontinuities and
nonlinearity, the optimization problem is hard to solve
reliably with standard packaged solvers. To overcome
this, the key model decision (variable quantity of water to
lease to or from irrigators) is discretized and represented
as a set of fractional values. These fractional values repre-
sent 5% intervals of the full amount of water available for
both irrigation and environmental allocation in each year.
The multiple-period environmental outcome space (the
possible values of the objective function expressed in
equation (10)) is fully enumerated for all possible discrete
combinations of leasing decisions in T ¼ 3 periods. As all
possible decisions and outcomes are computed prior to so-
lution, the problem is then one of choosing an optimized
combination of possible leasing activities in T periods that
achieves the minimum possible value of equation (10).
This reduces the model to a simple convex archetype that
solves reliably. In the discretization of the model, the
index: c {1 . . . 20} represents the fraction of total water
allocation released to the environment, expressed in
discrete 5% increments (i.e., 0.00, 0.05, 0.10, . . . , 0.95) ;
i {1, 2 . . . 6} indicates the zones targeted for environmen-
tal water ﬂows from Table 1; t {1, . . . , T} is the year in
the hydrological time series where T¼ 113 in the current
simulation; and  {0, 1, 2} is the index of the 3 year plan-
ning horizon.
[34] Note that the  index is used in combination with the
t index, effectively giving a rolling planning horizon of
 þ t¼ t, t þ 1, t þ 2. That is, for a given year t, the planning
horizon includes the current year and the following 2 years.
The outcome of the EWH decision in the current year is
deterministic given that allocation levels are announced at
the beginning of the period and ﬂows are known when the
EWH decides how much to lease to or from irrigators. How-
ever, the decision is chosen based on future expectations
about allocations and ﬂows for the following 2 years, which
are stochastic. It is assumed that the EWH knows the proba-
bility distribution of the whole hydrological time series and
uses the expected value of the time series for all expected
future water ﬂows. Note that this expected value assumption
could be updated to allow for a learning algorithm based on
an auto-correlation prediction of the time series in future
research. We comment on this further in the discussion. The

























[35] In this model formulation, the term ac; tþ , a binary
choice variable indicating the level of environmental water
released in each year of the planning horizon. The EWH
must choose one unique environmental water level in each
period of the planning horizon:
X
c
ac; tþ ¼ 1: ð12Þ
[36] The actions of the EWH are constrained by ﬁnancial
requirements. This means that the EWH must plan to be
self-funded over the planning horizon (equation (13)), and
any trading proﬁts accumulated over time must not grow






ac; tþ WPc;tþ  etc; tþ j ew t
" #
 0 ð13Þ
where WPc;tþ is the expected future water allocation price,
and Et is the period t expectations operator. Equation (13)
controls for the requirement that expected proﬁt over the
planning horizon must be non-negative, given expected
water allocations. The upper bound on accumulated proﬁts is
Xt
n¼1
1þ intð Þt1n  Max ð14Þ
Figure 3. Conceptual representation of environmental
damage function.
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where the index n¼ 1, . . . ,t allows us to sum over the
whole history up to time t ; int equals 0.05 is the interest
rate ; and Max equals $120 million is the maximum reve-
nue accumulation allowable. We choose this level as it
allows accumulation of revenues sufﬁcient to make large
purchases of 30% to 40% of all available case study
catchment allocations. In application, this constrains the
EWH from accumulating more than an average annual
proﬁt of approximately $106 million over the 113 year






etc; tþ : ð15Þ
[37] Note that in the above equation, proﬁt realized in
any given year is equal to the proﬁt from the ﬁrst period of
the planning horizon ( ¼ 0) in the expected proﬁt equation
(13). The expectation drops out of the equation because the
EWH’s allocation (ewt) is known, and hence there is no
uncertainty.
3.4. Water Price Model
[38] Water price impacts are modeled with the inverse
supply relationship derived from regressing past price on
level of allocation in the Murrumbidgee:
WPt ¼ 0 þ 1 iwt  ewt  ettð Þ ð16Þ
where WPt equates to the historic average annual water
allocation price in the Murrumbidgee.
[39] In the regression prediction using equation (16), ewt
and ett is taken away from irrigation allocation (iwt) such
that greater reallocations to the environment decrease irri-
gation supply and result in a higher market equilibrium
water price. The expected water price over time—and prob-
able future allocation state (p)—is then computed over 10
future allocation states with equal probabilities Pr(p)¼ 0.1,
as follows:
Et WPtþ½  ¼ 0 þ 1
X10
p¼1
Pr pð Þ iwtþ;p  ewtþ;p  ettþ;p
   !
8 ¼ 1; 2 ð17Þ
where Et [WPtþ] is the mathematical expectation of water
price in future periods. 0 and 1 are 7.092 and 0.0012,
respectively, and equate to the coefﬁcients obtained from
regressing historical allocation level on water allocation
prices for the period 1999 to 2008. The regression multiple
r-square is 0.85 and the results, including predicted annual
water allocation prices from the regression, are presented
graphically (Figure 4). While, this econometric water price
model is very simple, it is used because our tests of alterna-
tive speciﬁcations, for example including rainfall terms,
did not provide greater explanatory power.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. The Ecological Impact of More Environmental
Water Without Trade
[40] Consider ﬁrst reallocating 20% of irrigation entitle-
ment to the EWH, without allowing them to trade water.
The frames in Figure 5 show desired environmental ﬂow
return intervals, that is, the number of years since the area
experienced ﬂows at the desired level, as solid lines. The
three left hand side frames show the base case prior to real-
location of any irrigation water for environmental ﬂows.
The three right hand side frames show the modeled return
interval when 20% of irrigation entitlements have been
reallocated to the EWH. For both the base case and the
20% reallocation case without trade, modeled return inter-
vals for 800 GL, 1700 GL and 2700 GL ﬂow volumes are
then shown as dashed lines. Where the modeled environ-
mental ﬂow return interval (dashed line) rises above the ec-
ological interval/ﬂow goal (solid line), this indicates
periods when environmental interval/ﬂow goals would
have been less than the level required to maintain ecologi-
cal health objectives for the Lower Murrumbidgee ﬂood-
plain. In those instances, the probability of ecological
damage increases.
[41] The results show that improvement in ecological
outcomes, dependent primarily on ﬂows of less than 800
GL, can be achieved simply through water reallocation.
That is, no additional EWH trade is necessary to create
inundations on intervals consistent with the EWH objec-
tives for the 800 GL inundation zone. This is evident in the
top right hand side frame of Figure 4 where it can be seen
that, with a 20% reallocation of water to the environment
and no trade, the desired return intervals of 2 years or less
for ﬂoods of less than 800 GL is never exceeded. This
result suggests that the ﬂexibility to trade could allow
achievement of inundation goals for this inundation zone
with less permanent water allocation; although this possi-
bility is not analyzed in detail. In contrast, the base case
shows a signiﬁcant period at the end of the time series
where no ﬂoods >800 GL occur for 5 years, which is sig-
niﬁcantly greater than the desired maximum return interval
of 2 years.
[42] As can be seen in the bottom two frames of Figure
5, for the base case there are several periods where the
intervals between moderately large (i.e.,> 1700 GL) and
very large (i.e.,> 2700 GL) ﬂoods exceed the recom-
mended return interval periods. This is most notable for the
Millennium drought at the very end of the modeled hydrol-
ogy time series, and the Federation drought at the very be-
ginning of the time series (as circled in Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 4. Murrumbidgee water allocation price/alloca-
tion levels regression predictions 1999–2008.
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[43] In both frames, the return interval for moderate
ﬂoods (1700 GL) exceeds 12 years. This compares poorly
with the 4 year minimum recommended return ﬂow/inter-
val requirement for 1700 GL ﬂooding necessary to main-
tain ecosystem health [MDBA, 2012a]. Similarly in the
base case, modeled intervals between very large ﬂooding
events (2700 GL) during both the Millennium and Feder-
ation droughts are around 20 years. This also compares
poorly to the recommended return interval of 6.67 years
(Table 1). The impact of a 20% reallocation of water from
irrigation to the EWH on frequency of moderately large
and very large ﬂoods can be seen by comparing the right
Figure 5. Modeled return period between ﬂows of 800, 1700, and 2700 GL for base case and 20% real-
location of irrigation entitlements to the environment, no trade.
Figure 6. MDB signiﬁcant ﬂooding and drought events (source: MDBA [2012b]).
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hand and left hand sides of the plots in Figure 5. Notably,
there are fewer of periods of return intervals less than rec-
ommended for larger ﬂoods. Further, the duration between
moderately large and very large ﬂows is reduced when
20% of irrigation entitlements have been reallocated to the
EWH. That said, with a 20% reallocation there are several
instances of large and moderately large ﬂood return inter-
vals that exceed what would support a high probability of
maintaining ﬂoodplain ecological health.
[44] We therefore conclude that returning 20% of irriga-
tion allocations to the environment can provide ﬂoods of
magnitude >800 GL at a frequency sufﬁcient to maintain
the ecological health of 18% of the Lower Murrumbidgee
Flood and about 47% of Lower Murrumbidgee Floodplain
River Redgum area [MDBA, 2012a]. However, this action
alone does not provide ﬂoods >1700 GL with sufﬁcient
frequency to maintain habitat reliant on such ﬂoods in good
ecological health. The most notable periods of return ﬂow
intervals in excess of that required for large and very large
ﬂoods are the Millennium drought at the end of the time se-
ries and the Federation drought at the beginning of the
series.
4.2. The Benefits of EWH Trade
[45] The results above illustrate that simply reallocating
some water to the environment from irrigation is sufﬁcient
to meet ecologically desirable ﬂood return interval objec-
tives for smaller and moderate ﬂows 800 GL. However,
simply reallocating 20% of irrigation entitlement was not
estimated to be sufﬁcient to meet recommended return
intervals for moderately large and very large ﬂoods. Our
modeling results provide some evidence that EWH annual
water lease trading can improve the frequency of moder-
ately large ﬂoods 1700 GL (Figure 7).
[46] Under an assumed 20% reallocation of water entitle-
ments to the environment, the top two frames in Figure 7
show how estimated time intervals between ﬂoods of this
magnitude change when the possibility of EWH trade is
introduced. Comparing the top left (without trade) and top
right (with trade) frames in Figure 7, it is evident that
allowing the EWH to trade can reduce or shorten the inci-
dence of return intervals in excess of the ecologically desir-
able return period for moderately large ﬂoods (i.e., 1700
GL). The ability to avoid longer than ecologically desirable
intervals between moderately large ﬂoods, once EWH trade
is introduced, is most notable during the Federation drought
period at the beginning of the modeled hydrology
sequence. Comparing the top left and right frames in Figure
7 shows that the return interval of over 6 years in the 20%
reallocation without trade scenario can be reduced below
the ecologically recommended interval objective of 4 years.
Additionally, a slightly longer than ecologically recom-
mended drought in the mid-1940s is entirely avoided.
Finally, the length of time between ﬂows 1700 GL is
reduced by more than 1 year during the Millennium
drought from greater than eight to less than 7 years follow-
ing the introduction of EWH trade.
[47] On the other hand, the introduction of EWH trade
appears to offer little opportunity to reduce return intervals
between very large ﬂoods (i.e., 2700 GL). This is evident
in Figure 7, where in the bottom left (without trade) and
bottom right (with trade) frames the periods of time since a
ﬂood 2700 GL are nearly identical. Essentially, this indi-
cates that ﬂoods of very large magnitude are rare and pri-
marily weather-driven events, not easily manipulated by
river management and/or water trade actions available to
the EWH. We experimented with the level of reallocation
from irrigation to the EWH necessary to achieve ﬂoods of
Figure 7. Modeled return period between ﬂows of 1700 and 2700 GL for 20% reallocation of irrigation
entitlements to the environment; with and without trade.
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magnitude greater than >2700 GL on the frequency
required for a high likelihood of good ecological health for
habitat dependent on such large ﬂood events and found that
achieving these large ﬂood return intervals was only possi-
ble with a reallocation of greater than 70% of irrigation
water entitlements to the EWH.
[48] It is possible that altering some of the parameters in
our modeling speciﬁcation could improve prospects of
achieving very large magnitude ﬂoods through EWH trad-
ing. Currently, the ability to achieve very large ﬂoods is
limited in two ways: one is the fund accumulation limit
which currently does not allow accumulation of enough
money to buy more than about one third of total allocations
in any given year; another potential limitation is the 3 year
time horizon. A longer time horizon and a higher limit on
fund accumulation may allow accumulation of sufﬁcient
funds for the kinds of very large water purchases that
would be required to facilitate more frequent very large
ﬂoods. Given that such accumulation would require forfeit-
ing opportunities for smaller ﬂoods, trading to achieve
more frequent very large ﬂoods may also require a greater
weighting of larger less frequent ﬂoods in the EWH
objective.
4.3. EWH Trading Dynamics and Water Price
Impacts
[49] Dynamic EWH buying and selling behavior is
driven by the model objective function and budget con-
straints. These, in turn, mimic the incentives and con-
straints faced by the EWH. As explained in equation (10)
and shown in Figure 3, the objective is to minimize envi-
ronmental damage (expressed as an increasing function of
the difference between actual and desirable return intervals
between ﬂows of various volumes). As the intervals
between ﬂoods increase, the incentive to buy water to sup-
plement ﬂows and avoid longer return intervals also
increases. On the other hand, funds to buy water must be
earned from water sales. Consequently, there is an incen-
tive to sell just after a ﬂood when expected environmental
damage from reduced environmental water is minimal,
because the probability of exceeding the desired return
interval in the near term is relatively low [Costello, 2012].
A third motivation for EWH behavior is the non-negative
revenue constraint. This, along with the environmental
objective, provides an incentive for the EWH to sell at
higher prices and buy at lower prices, where possible.
Finally, in some years, the EWH must buy water simply to
comply with the maximum revenue accumulation con-
straint, regardless of other environmental or cost
considerations.
[50] The potential water price impacts of these somewhat
complex EWH trade incentives and constraints is of central
interest to irrigators, as it may impact upon water prices
and costs of production. Figures 8 and 9 provide a summary
of water leasing and water allocation price outcomes. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates how additional demand or supply from
EWH leasing inﬂuences water allocation price. EWH leas-
ing from irrigators drives up the price, while EWH leasing
to irrigators drives the price downward in accord with the
endogenous water allocation price relation included in the
model as outlined by equation (16). It can be seen that,
while in some years the impact results in higher water
allocation prices, in other years it is lower. Overall a pat-
tern of correlation between price impact direction and
water scarcity (e.g., a tendency to bid up price in water
scarce years) is not clearly evident.
[51] On average, we estimate a negligibly lower price for
water allocations across years in the with trade scenario
($217.70) than in the without trade scenario ($218.30).We
conclude that, at least for the modeled conditions, EWH
trading behavior may have little inﬂuence on water alloca-
tion price on average. That is, we ﬁnd essentially symmet-
ric bidding up and bidding down effects from EWH supply
and demand decisions (Figure 9). Despite little inﬂuence on
average price, EWH trading appears to have potential to
moderate water price volatility somewhat; estimated var-
iance in water price in the trading scenario was about 20%
less than in the no trade scenario. The model does predict a
signiﬁcant water allocation price rise from $153/ML to
$218/ML on average as a result of relative scarcity induced
by a 20% water reallocation from irrigators to the
environment.
[52] An additional summary of modeled EWH trade out-
comes is provided in Figure 10. The chart illustrates that
yearly leasing from irrigators occurs more frequently than
yearly leasing to irrigators. Notably, the average price for
Figure 8. Expected water allocation price with and with-
out environmental water trade.
Figure 9. Average water allocation price impact of 20%
reallocation and EWH trade.
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leasing to irrigators ($266/ML) is somewhat higher than
the average price for leasing from irrigators ($191/ML),
and the total volume leased from irrigators over the entire
hydrology sequence somewhat exceeds the total volume
leased to irrigators. This result, essentially demonstrates
some tendency to ‘‘buy low and sell high.’’ The result is
somewhat consistent with Kirby et al. [2006], suggesting
such behavior could be an advantageous strategy to
improve the cost-effectiveness of achieving environmental
watering objectives. However, the extent of opportunity for
such an approach appears to be more limited with this
model speciﬁcation than was the case in the Kirby et al.
[2006] model. This may be a result of: the endogenous
price impacts included here, but not in their study; some-
what more explicit and temporally dependent environmen-
tal objectives included in the current model speciﬁcation;
and greater geographic scope or opportunity for carryover
included in their analysis.
4.4. Caveats to the Study Findings
[53] Before concluding this section, it should be noted
that there are several limitations and opportunities to
extend the analysis presented here. First, results are for a
single catchment, and the conditions in other catchments
may afford more or less opportunity for ecological beneﬁt
from EWH trading.
[54] Second, we have not considered the opportunity for
irrigators to learn about EWH trading behavior, nor the
impact within a water season of EWH trading behavior.
Evidence from the water market suggests that irrigators
quickly learn about, and take advantage of strategic oppor-
tunities to beneﬁt from trade. For example, the recent intro-
duction of more advantageous carryover provisions in
some states appears to have led to large trade into Victoria
to hold water where more carryover is possible [NWC,
2012]. Irrigators may also learn about EWH trade objec-
tives and identify opportunities to command higher prices.
This could reduce the potential ecological beneﬁts of envi-
ronmental water trading [Iftekhar et al., 2013]. Third, in
addition to trade, the CEWH will have some opportunity to
carryover water. Regulating legislation essentially requires
prioritization of carryover ahead of trade. This may provide
some ecological beneﬁt with an approach that reduces addi-
tional beneﬁts from trade. Finally, we have not explored
opportunities to sell permanent water entitlements or lease
out water annually in one catchment where it is less essen-
tial for ecological outcomes with an objective of ﬁnancing
purchase or lease of more entitlement in locations where it
is more critical to meeting or maintaining environmental
health.
5. Conclusions
[55] This study models possible ecological and economic
impacts of returning water from irrigation to an EWH.
Additionally, we model the possible impacts of providing
an EWH the ﬂexibility to trade water allocations on an an-
nual basis. Speciﬁcation of the EWH’s objectives and con-
straints were chosen to reﬂect actual conditions faced by
Australia’s MDB CEWH, who is tasked with using MDB
held environmental water for maintaining and improving
environmental outcomes. We modeled one catchment, the
Murrumbidgee, and a 20% reallocation of water from irri-
gation to the environmental water holder. For the condi-
tions and location considered, we found that desired
frequencies of relatively small ﬂoods (800 GL), as
expressed in the latest MDBA assessment of desired eco-
logical ﬂow regimes for the Lower Murrumbidgee Flood-
plains, could be achieved simply by a 20% water
reallocation from irrigation to the EWH; whether or not op-
portunity for EWH trade exists. We also found negligibly
opportunities to inﬂuence frequency of very large ﬂoods
(2700 GL) by allowing EWH trade. Massive and infre-
quent ﬂooding events are essentially ‘‘acts of God,’’ and of
such large volumes that they overwhelm storages and
opportunities for environmental water holder manipulation.
[56] In contrast, we found that allowing EWH to trade
water annually may provide some opportunity to reduce the
time between ﬂoods of moderately large magnitude (i.e.,
1700 GL for the Murrumbidgee). More speciﬁcally, in the
case of a 20% reallocation without the capacity to trade, we
estimated that two signiﬁcant drought events with signiﬁ-
cantly greater than the desired return interval for such ﬂoods
would occur. Introducing the possibility for EWH water
trade provided an opportunity to eliminate one of these
events. Such action could have positive ecological impacts
for signiﬁcant River Redgum communities in the moderate
to higher elevation Lower Murrumbidgee Floodplains.
[57] A concern for some irrigators may be that a trading
EWH, as the single largest water holder in the MDB, may
create pecuniary externalities, for example, by bidding up
water allocation prices faced by irrigators also seeking to
lease in additional water in times of scarcity. Results did
show that those who do not trade with the EWH but wish to
lease from other irrigators in the same years as the EWH
chooses to trade, can face higher water lease costs than
they would otherwise. However, the magnitude of such pe-
cuniary externalities arising from trading consistent with
provisions in the legislation regulating the CEWH were
found to be small on average and were as likely to inﬂu-
ence irrigators’ returns positively as negatively.
[58] In summary, we ﬁnd that there are opportunities for
signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁts, and that pecuniary
externalities are unlikely to create efﬁciency losses or even
very large redistribution impacts; we conclude that the ben-
eﬁts of developing EWH trading may well justify the costs.
Figure 10. Summary of EWH water trading outcomes.
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